标题：Why and When Is Bailout Optimal?' '&' ' ' '&' ' 汇报人：Yunhong Yang (GuanghuaSchoolof Management, PKU)

功夫：10月29日（周四）10:00-11:30am

地址：拉斯维加斯9888新楼216教室

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提要：This paper builds a dynamic framework to study the behavior of a typical commercial bank in financial crises. The bank' '&' 'rsquo;s financial structure has a feedback effect on its investment selection by limiting the bank' '&' 'rsquo;s business activity.When the invested project falls into trouble temporally,the bank will make choicesbetween takeover and liquidation of the project based on the optimal capital-asset ratio and the capital-asset ratio required by the regulatory authority, which will affect the bail-out policy of the government during the financial crises. Our main findings are: (1) When the required capital-asset ratio is low enough, bank will act independently on the troublesome project by optimizing its capital-asset ratio. Thus, it is much more efficient to allow the bank to tackle the troublesome project without the bailout policy. (2) When the required capital-asset ratio is too high for the bank to make its own decision to deal with the troublesome project, it is necessary for the government to launch a bailout program. (3) The bailout policy could target the project or the bank. It is optimal to bailout the bank directly because of the leverage advantages of the bank' '&' 'rsquo;s capital.